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MUSLIM SAINTS IN THE AGE OF NEOLIBERALISM
Benjamin F. Soares
Approaches to the study of religion and modernity inspired by Weber
and some of his Interpreters tend to posit that the rationalization
accompanying the spread of éducation, urbanization, and other signs
of the modern, necessarily leads to a décline of so-called traditional
religious practices (cf. Weber 1978). While anthropologists have long
deemed such models to be of doubtful Utility in understanding most
societies, the persistence of such Weberian approaches—or, at least,
assumptions—in the anthropological study of Muslim societies is strik-
ing. Indeed, there is a considérable body of anthropological literature
that points to the waning influence of Muslim saints, their practices,
and organizational structures (the Sufi orders) in different Muslim
societies. The genera! argument is that saints and their 'magical'
practices become less socially relevant with increased éducation,
urbanization, and the rise of a middle class, and the saints become
confined to the 'populär' or 'traditional' éléments or socially marginal
in Muslim societies (e.g., Crapanzano 1973; Eickelman 1976; Gilsenan
1973, 1982; cf. Ewing 1983; Hoffman 1995), and are eventually
replaced by 'orthodox' scripturalist Islam (Geertz 1968, Lambek 1993).
Such approaches are perhaps best exemplified in the work of Gellner,
who asserts that with "the coming of modernity" and the arrivai of
the 'modern' state those quintessentially traditional religious figures,
Muslim saints, "are seen to retain some of their [inherited] perks
but to perform little or no social fonction" (Gellner 1981, 56-7; cf.
Asad 1986, Zubaida 1995). According to Gellner, thé religious author-
ity of saints will necessarily décline in thé face of "reformist" Muslims,
those more 'modern,' sober, textually oriented Muslims—effectively
Weberian puritans—who question thé legitimacy of saints and their
'traditional' practices (Gellner 1981: passim, see also Gellner 1992, 1994).
Such assumptions and narratives are even apparent in some of
the most recent social science literature about Muslim societies, as,
for example, in thé considérable attention to so-called Islamism or
political Islam.1 However, other scholars, pace Gellner, hâve pointed
1 For example, in Muslim Politics, Eickelman and Piscatori (1996, see also Eickelman
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to the continuing importance, even révérence of such 'traditional'
figures as Muslim saints in certain Muslim societies. This is the case,
most notably in parts of Africa, and Senegal in particular, where
various studies have focused on the Mourides, a Sufi order, and its
founding Muslim saint, Amadou Bamba, and his followers and suc-
cessors (cf. Copans 1988; Cruise O'Brien 1971, 1975; Gouion 1981,
Seesemann 1993). While it is arguably misleading to suggest that the
expérience of the Mourides and Muslim saints in Senegal is in any
way typical of postcolonial Africa,2 Muslim saints are key actors in
certain places in postcolonial Africa, as they are in Mali.3 Nearly
two decades of neoliberal reforms and the implementation of struc-
tural adjustment programs have been accompanied by sharp eco-
nomie décline in Mali. Most Malians—salaried and unsalaried—have
difficulty making a living, whether in agriculture, trade, or the civil
service. While social reproduction has become both more difficult
and elusive for most Malians, many elite and nonelite Muslims stand
firm in their attachment to particular Muslim saints who seem to
have become even more important in this era of fantastic wealth
alongside deprivation—a situation in which narratives of progressive
rationalization are simply not relevant.
Drawing on research in two different and sometimes competing
Islamic religieus centers and among three lineages of Islamic reli-
gious specialists in postcolonial Mali, I trace transformations in the
nature of the religieus authority that have accompanied the period
of neoliberal reforms. I examine some of the ways in which the
1998) attempt to assess the complexity of changes occurring within various con-
temporary Muslim societies but, in doing so, fail to deal adequately with the con-
tinuing importance of such 'traditional' figures as Muslim saints and their 'esoteric'
(or 'occult') practices in certain societies. See Comaroff and ComarofF 1999 for a
discussion of the importance of the occult.
2 For a critique of the overemphasis on the Mourides or 'Moundocentrism' in
the study of Islam in Africa, see Triaud 1986. A notable exception to such
Mouridocentrism is Villalón 1995.
3 The importance of saints in postcolonial sub-Saharan African and particularly
in former French colonies clearly relates to the history of colonial rule and French
colonial policies towards Muslims—what was called 'la politique musulmane.' During
the colonial period, the French colonial administration generally sought the 'loy-
alty' of 'marabouts'—Muslim religieus leaders, saindy or otherwise—to whom ordi-
nary people were assumed to owe allegiance French colonial policy toward Islam
and Muslims might be summed up as the attempt of the French to elevate a Muslim
establishment, including some saints who have played important rôles in the post-
colonial period. On such colonies' policies and their implications, see Harrison 1988,
Launay and Soares 1999, Robinson and Triaud 1997, and Soares 1997b, 2000.
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world of commodities has come to permeate the largely ritualized
'visite' with or 'pilgrimages' to exceptional Muslim religious leaders
considered saints. I argue that certain processes of commodification—
the exchange of blessings and prayers for commodities, the prolifération
of personal and impersonal Islamic religious commodities—have
intensified around saints in the neoliberal era. Such processes of
commodification have facilitated the personalization of religious author-
ity in certain provincial Muslim saints, to whom many hâve turned
for succor in thèse times of political and économie uncertainty. Thèse
living Muslim saints are exemplars for ordinary people though clearly
not the puritans or ascetic world-renouncers that Weberian models
would lead one to expect (e.g., Dumont 1980, Tambiah 1984, cf.
Sahlins 1992). Through their gréât wealth, very large families, and
large entourages, certain Muslim saints exhibit thé capacity for suc-
cessful social reproduction, which is precisely what has become much
more difficult for the vast majority, who face an increasingly precarious
existence in the era of neoliberal reforms, declining real wages, cut-
backs in public services and éducation, and recurring political crises.
I argue that such saints hâve become more privatized religious
figures—effectively free-floating sanctifiers—in a religious economy
that has come to be more like a market. Not only have these Muslim
saints been able to outiast secular political regimes, but they also
seem to have overcome some of the uncertainties of the market and
even appear to offer ordinary people the means of doing so.
Saints and Superstars
I want to begin with a discussion of Muslim saints in Mali. Although
the term saint is borrowed from Christianity, it is préférable to some
of the other possible options—such as marabout in French or shaykh
in Arabie—which are too vague for thé exceptional Muslim religious
figures of Mali. By saint, I am referring to the term wall in Arabie,
which is actually a loan word in many languages spoken in West
Africa.4 If there are différent ways of being a Muslim saint and
4 The term is used in ail thé major languages spoken in thé région of my research,
including Bamanakan/Bambara, Hassaniyya, Jakhanke, Pulaar/Fulfulde, and Somnke.
It is interesting to note that some non-Muslim Bambara in thé région use thé same
term for exceptional non-Muslim religious figures, attempts (e.g., Dieterlen 1951) to
downplay thé influence of Islam on non-Muslims' religious practices notwithstanding.
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various 'modern' trajectories of Muslim sainthood in contemporary
West Africa,5 the Muslim saints I consider here are all well-known
religious leaders, who, with one exception, are still living. In Mali,
only the most exceptional Mushm religious leaders are considered
saints. A whole host of possibly intersecting circumstances—attract-
ing many followers; developing a réputation for learning, piety, and
generosity; or having prodigious powers, such as mystical insight—
may lead some people to consider a religious leader exceptional.
Although much of the scholarly literature dealing with Muslim soci-
eties discusses such phenomena by way of the concept of baraka, usu-
ally glossed as blessing, 'grâce,' or as some kind of unproblematic
Weberian conception of charisma, I want to suggest that these phe-
nomena are considerably more complex.6 In large parts of West
Africa, some people are thought to have special 'power,' with power
conceived as force in its spiritual and material sensés, suggesting
authority in Weberian formulations (cf. Weber 1978, Turner 1974).
Power here is meant to indicate God's favor, for which there is
no single term but is instead a whole host of related notions in the
region's vernaculars, such as 'gifts of God,' as well as baraka, huma
(Arabic, sanctity), and m'ma (Ar., prosperity), to name only a few
words of Arabic origin in the region's vernaculars that people frequently
invoke when they talk about important Muslim religious leaders.
There is a sense that power émanâtes from God who bestows his
favor on whomever hè wants (cf. Denny 1988). Broadly conceived,
God's favor is indexed by all that people might want: wealth, good
health, power, progeny, good fortune, social prestige, and so forth.
The truly exceptional—even more so than those with 'power'—
are thought to be saints.7 Saints are usually men, though in some
cases they can be women, and saints may be living or deceased; the
latter is perhaps the most important différence between Muslim and
Christian saints. People présume that saints are actually closer than
ordinary Muslims to God, as well as to the Prophet Muhammad—
at least in a metaphorical sense. Malian Muslims talk about saints
as leading exemplary lives in the sense that they follow very closely
3 See Ewmg 1983 and Werbner and Basu 1998 for a discussion of Muslim saints
and sainthood in South Asia
6 Cf Geertz 1968, Gilsenan 1973, Eickelman 1976, and Cruise O'Bnen and
Coulon 1988, to name only some ol the most mfluential studies of Mushm saints
For a recent example, see Hammoudi 1997
7 Much of the scholarly literature refers to thèse people as saints and points to
their chansma-hke quahues (eg, Gellner 1969, Cruise O'Brien and Coulon 1988)
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the life of the Prophet Muhammad, who was known as 'the Perfect
Man' (Ar., al-insan al-kamil). This notion that Muhammad was the
perfect man has been developed in the scholarly literature of Sufism,
the mystical tradition in Islam; it is widely understood by Muslims from
broad sectors of the society in this part of West Africa.8 By association
with the Prophet Muhammad and his exemplary life, saints embody
a certain kind of morality. Like the Prophet Muhammad, they are
known for their piety and dévotion to God and their other positively
valued qualities, which are thought to surpass that of ordinary Muslims.
Malian Muslims, like many Muslims elsewhere, point out that it is
God who confers sainthood upon whom hè chooses. In this context,
one never déclares oneself a saint. This contrasts, for example, with
the celebrated thirteenth-century Sun, Ibn 'Arabi (Ghodkiewicz 1986),
or more directly relevant for the context of my research, Ahmad al-
Tijani, the founder of the Tijaniyya, perhaps the most important
Sun order in West Africa (Abun-Nasr 1965), both of whom are
reported to have proclaimed themselves to be living saints.
Although one may be a samt without one's or others' awareness
of it, there are certain reported signs of sainthood, particularly an
association with wondrous things—karamat in Arabic and kabako in
Bamanakan/Bambara, Mali's most important lingua fiança. One of
the most frequently discussed of such wonders in Mali is the ability
to predict the future. Moreover, it is widely reported in Mali and
much further afield that God will answer the supplicatory or peti-
tionary prayers (Ar., du'd) of a saint or at least it is more likely that
God will answer such prayers. This relates to the idea that saints
have special access to God and his favor. For this reason, many seek
out saints to ask them to intercède on their behalf wilh God. In
short, such saints "speak for men to God" (see Beidelman 1971). At
the same time, many fear saints. Many Malians told me that to be
against a saint was basically to be against God.9
B On the subject of the perfect man, see chapter 2 of Nicholson 1921 See Soares
and Hun wiek 1996 for a discussion of a poem from West Africa that praises a par-
ticular samt—the father of one of the saints discussed here—m terms like that of
the perfect man See also Werbner 1998 for a considération of this notion among
Sufis m Pakistan and Bntain and the exemplary life of saints
9 Such a notion almost certamly cornes from the statements and practices attnb-
uted to thé Prophet Muhammad (hadiths 01 'traditions') Malian Muslim scholars
learn such hadiths through thé study of texts m Arabie Many laypcrsons also learn
them through published French translations At the same ùme, such knowledge is
also part of oral discourse m this région
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In Mäh, people can learn about contemporary Muslim saints
through eyewitness accounts and oral narratives about the wonders
associated with them, but perhaps as often through radio, télévision,
and populär culture, more generally. Malians can view coverage of
the annual visits with saints on national télévision in programs that
usually feature images of the large crowds in attendance or listen to
coverage of such annual events on national radio. They can also lis-
ten to audiocassette recordings of gnots and other such 'traditional-
ists' who laud the virtues of a particular saint or hear songs in praise
of various saints and their illustrious ancestors on the radio.10 In one
song that has received a lot of attention in Mali, a Malian record-
ing artist, Ina Baba Coulibaly, sings about her own 'pilgrimage' to
the town where a Malian saint lives and the blessings she antici-
pâtes." The most prominent saints in Mali have celebrity status. We
might even call them the superstars among the contemporary Muslim
religious leaders of Mali.
Beginning in the 1970s, the decade following independence from
French colonial rule and after the overthrow of Mali's first post-
colonial socialist regime (generally considered hostile to religion), sev-
eral lineages with claims to Islamic religious authority initiated annual
large-scale 'visits'—the term used dérives from the Arabic zjyara—
with celebrated saints in provincial towns quite a distance from
Bamako, the capital and largest city, as well as from other impor-
tant centers of economie activity in Mali. Located on the edge of
the désert, the towns are backwaters whose rôles in the economy
dechned along with trans-Saharan trade, the development of colo-
nial urban centers, and récurrent periods of drought. Although there
have been high rates of migration from these towns to areas of
greater economie activity, the economie changes associated with
neoliberalism—the opening up of local markets, the nood of Imports,
and the décline of the economy—have meant that even more peo-
ple are having difficulties making ends meet. For this reason, migra-
tion increased to other places in Mali, to more prospérons countries
such as Côte d'Ivoire or to Central Africa, not to mention long-term
10 Some of these recordings are commerually produced and available for sale m
the market See McLaughlm 1997 for a discussion of Islam and populär music m
neighbormg Senegal
11 Ina Baba Couhbaly, Allah hollame [Fulfulde, "God show me "] (Camara
Productions, Pans, nd, CK7 031)
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migration to France and much farther afield. Be this as it may, thé
towns in which thé saints live are known in thé urban imaginary,
not only as important centers of Islamic learning—both past and
present—but also as places where the inhabitants are thought to be
more pious Muslims and thé actual towns are thought to be blessed.
The saints and their lineages are what we might call saintly lin-
eages, following anthropologists, such as Gellner (1969) and Geertz
(1968), who both worked in Norm Africa. Thèse saintly lineages
descend from key precolonial and early colonial Muslim religious
figures with réputations for scholarship, piety, association with won-
drous things, thé propagation of Islam in thé région, and, in one
case, persécution under French colonial rule.12 While members of
one of thé saintly lineages claim descent from the Prophet Muhammad,
the other two lineages—whose saintly réputations are no less impec-
cable—do not. Each of thé saintly lineages is also associated with
one of thé two principal Sun orders present hère—the Qadiriyya or
thé Tijaniyya—and members of the lineages hold high-ranking posi-
tions within thèse Sun orders. Since the late 1980s, with the advent
of the era of neoliberalism, thé saints seem to hâve acquired fan-
tastic wealth. They live in gréât comfort in newly constructed impos-
ing homes, surrounded by their families (invariably comprising several
wives and numerous children—upwards of fifty each in two of the
cases), many followers, servants, and retainers.
There are représentatives of each saintly lineage living in the
capital, not to mention in other towns and dues in Mali and in
neighboring countries. Thèse représentatives coordinate the trips of
individuals and délégations—both men and women—to thé respec-
tive provincial towns for thé annual visits, which hâve become highly
organized affairs involving thousands of people.13 Many of thèse peo-
ple are urban dwellers, often migrants, involved with modem éco-
nomie activities, who usually travel in groups to thé towns where
they spend a few days, a week, or longer. During the visits, people
gather for performance of thé ritual daily prayers, or salât. They lis-
ten to poetry in honor of thé Prophet Muhammad and of the respec-
tive saint, and his ancestor(s). In the afternoons and evenings, people
12 I have written elsewhere about the histories of the saintly lineages considered
here Sec Soares 1996a, 1997a, 1997b
13 Two of the 'visits' follow the Islamic lunar calendar and are held on or shortly
after the mawhd, the célébration of the Prophet Muhammad's birth l hè third annual
visit is held around harvesttime m December or January
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also listen to other, usually more junior, religieus leaders who give
sermons—often in the vernaculars—about Islam and the way to con-
duct oneself äs a proper Muslim. '4 Those who are members of the
Sufi order to which thé saint belongs also meet to recite collectively
the special litany of prayers (Ar., wird) of that particular Sufi order.
Visitors also eat meals with groups of other visitors and, usually, at
least once, all together.15
Gifts and Commoditi.es
One of the central features of the relationship between saintly lineages
and ordinary Muslims in Mali is the giving of gifts. Muslims in West
Africa have long brought gifts to religious leaders, usually seeking
blessings from thcm or for their intercession with God. I want to
relate such gifts and gift giving to regionally salient conceptions of
Islam and what is thought to be the proper comportment of Muslims
before considering changes in the era of neoliberalism. In Islam,
Muslims are not only encouraged but also commanded to give to
others. Along with prayer, giving to others is one of the main virtues
repeatedly stressed in the Qur'an, the sacred text for Muslims. Indeed,
one of the so-called five pillars of Islam is zakat, or the alms expected
from all Muslims. Such alms are obligatory, and many, if not all,
Malian Muslims would state this is the case. In the past, before
French colonial rule, certain Muslim religious leaders and rulers in
this part of West Africa collected what they considered zakat. Under
colonial rule, the French suppressed the collection of zakat and imposed
a system of taxation not based on Islamic jurisprudence that has sur-
vived into the postcolonial period. Today, what many Muslims in
Mali, including saints, give annually to the poor and needy, and
what they also give to the poor at the end of Ramadan (the yearly
month of fasting from dawn to dusk) is called zakat. Many people
elsewhere in the Muslim world use the same term.
One finds another notion of alms, sadaqa, that is rather different
14 None of the saints discussed here makes public pronouncements or seimons (Ar ,
wa'ai) that circulate on audiocassettes 01 m wntten form, as is the case for other
Muslims elsewhere m Mali and in many places m the contemporary Muslim world
On the history of Muslim preachers and public serinons m Mali, see Soares n d 2
l j Space limitations prevent me from discussmg the considérable économie effects
of such a pilgnmage economy on the two towns.
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from zakat but equally, if not more, important in Muslim West Africa.
In général, what one gives willingly and informally to others in one's
daily life or what one gives, sometimes even sacrifices, following the
recommendations of a Muslim religious leader is considered sadaqa.16
It is this second notion of alms or charity that is undoubtedly more
widespread in this part of West Africa. According to the Qur'an and
other Islamic texts, such as hadiths, such alms are usually for the
poor and the needy (see Ali 1984, ix, 60). Therefore, the gifts that
Muslim religious leaders receive are not considered alms. This clearly
relates to the idea that descendants of the Prophet Muhammad—
sharifs (Arabic)—never keep alms for themselves. One finds this in
local discourse and pracüce, as well as in statements attributed to
the Prophet Muhammad (see El Bokhari 1964, 138). In principle,
those lineages claiming descent from the Prophet Muhammad, and,
by extension, all religious leaders of elevated status in this part of
West Africa, never accept gifts designated as sadaqa for their own
consumption (that is, at least, in theory). In pracüce, some people
do give alms to elevated religious leaders for distribution to the poor
on their bchalf.
In any case, the gifts that the most esteemed Muslim religious
leaders in Mali ordinarily receive are called hadaya in the region's ver-
naculars—Pulaar, Soninke, Bamanakan, Hassaniyya, and in other lan-
guages spoken in the vicinity. This word, hadaya, comes from the Arabic
word (hadîya; pi., hadaya) meaning 'gift' or 'present.' If in some places
in the Arabic-speaking world, such as nineteenth-century Egypt, the
word simply means 'gift,' the term is used exclusively for gifts in this
part of West Africa given to descendants of the Prophet Muhammad
and to descendants of al-Hajj Umar Tall, the leader of a nineteenth-
century Islamic state in this région, as well as others of similar stature.
In other words, hadaya are gifts given to Muslim religious leaders of
very high status, like the three main sainüy lineages I have studied.
Although some gifts offered to the Sultan in Morocco have been so
designated (Colin 1971, Dannerlein 2001), the longer history of these
practices of gift giving in West Africa and their possible relationship
to practices in North Africa are not at all clear (cf. Hamès 1979).
It is striking, however, that hadïya—gift giving to religious leaders—
does not figure as a category discussed in any way in thé standard
16 For a discussion of such 'sacrifice' m a West Afncan context, see Launay 1992,
cf Bowen 1992
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Islamic legal texts used in this région.17 All of the saints have répu-
tations for redistributing a portion of what they receive as alms to
thé poor and to members of their rather large entourages.
In giving gifts to others and quite often preferably to religions
leaders of elevated status, it is clear that people are doing more than
simply following Islamic legal texts or mechanically enacting rules for
alms or gift giving. In this context, one can say that in giving gifts
to others, people are often following religious commands. As many of
my informants noted, in giving gifts they wished to obtain baraji, which
means merit or divine recompense in several vernacular languages
in Mali. Although there was no consensus among my informants
about thé origins of the word baraji,>B some Muslim scholars explained
that the term corresponds to thé notion of merit (Ar., thawâb] one
finds in Islamic religious texts, while other scholars suggested other
terms with similar meanings (for example, Ar., fqjr).19 There was, how-
ever, agreement among my informants that baraji clearly has a sensé
of merit, which, they explained, is thé reward from God for one's
actions. One receives such a reward in this world — wealth, good
health, progeny, and so forth — or in thé hereafter, that is, either
access to heaven and eternal life or hell. There is a prevailing notion
that one receives such merit for alms — obligatory alms (zakat], vol-
untary alms (sadaqa), gifts, and generosity more generally. Those who
gave to others, including gifts to religious leaders, explicitly stated
that in doing so they hoped to receive such merit. Because saints
are thought to be close to God, one honors God through giving gifts
to saints, thereby possibly obtaining merit and, ultimately, God's
favor. Uncertainty is, however, inévitable. One never knows whether
or how exactly one will benefit from such merit in this world or thé
next. In any case, I want to emphasize that it is this notion of baraji
that is more important hère than, say, baraka, which many anthro-
pologists have highlighted, perhaps even overemphasized.20
17 See Ruxton 1916 and al-Qayrawani 1975, which are two standard texts of
the Maliki school of jurisprudence used m West Africa.
18 Some informants pointed out that the word did not appear to be of Arabie
origin. As évidence, one person noted that in Fulfulde/Pulaar the word did not
belong to thé same noun class usually reserved for words of foreign origin, includ-
mg many words from Arabie
19 It is mteresting to note that this word sometimes has the meaning of gift or
présent (see Kazimirski 1860, 1.13)
M See the références in note 6. I would not, however, go so far as Bourdieu
who writes about "thé almost empty notion of baraka" [emphasis m original] (1977,
228, n. 89).
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In exchange for gifts, Muslim religious leaders, including saints,
give blessings or petitionary prayers—in thé local vernaculars duwaw,
another loan word from Arabie—exactly as thé Prophet Muhammad
is reported to have done when hè received gifts (see Wensinck 1927,
88). As I have already noted, people say that God is more likely to
answer the prayers of a saint because saints have special access to
God and his favor. For this reason, individuals often seek out the
blessings of a saint or attempt to cultivate a relationship with a saint
and ask him to intercède with God in the hope of having personal
concerns addressed. Concerns of this nature might include the pur-
suit of wealth or prestige, or simply the avoidance of misfortune.
People report that saints are generally solicited less than they were
in the past for everyday somatic ailments. Frequently, when medi-
cine fails—during debilitating illnesses or chronic health problems,
such as infertility or what might be called mental illness—people
approach Muslim saints for intervention.
Because people consider giving gifts to saints morally correct, poten-
tially meritorious, even obligatory, visiting a saint without bringing a
gift is almost inconceivable. If one usually gives according to one's
means (but compare below), people also note that a gift should cor-
respond to thé stature of both thé person giving and thé person
receiving.21 One saint told me that he accepts ail gifts—regardless of
size or value—that people offer to him. On one occasion, while I
was talking with one of thé saints, a follower and companion of the
saint—a very poor man—approached and handed him a coin roughly
equivalent to a few pennies. Just a couple of days before, one of the
same saint's wealthy followers living in the capital had given the
saint a brand new imported ail-terrain vehicle to facilitate his travels.
For many people, the high point of an annual visit is the time
during which they deliver gifts to a saint. In rather formally struc-
tured rituals, saints receive visitors—both men and women. I have
seen ordinary followers lining up by thé hundreds, waiting as indi-
viduals or in groups to hand over their gifts—livestock, agricultural
products, consumer goods, envelopes filled with cash—to a member
of thé saint's entourage as thé saint stood close by. If one is lucky,
one might be able to shake the saint's hand at this time. Or the
saint might place his hand on one's shoulder or head or touch one's
prayer beads. Thèse are ail ways of blessing or transmitting charisma,
Eickelman (1976, 178) found similar practices m Morocco.
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to use the language of Weber. Such contact, however fleeting, is
greatly anticipated and eagerly sought. I have seen people trembling
with anticipation as they waited to hand over their gifts and possi-
bly be touched by the saint. Given the number of people involved
in the annual visits, these ritualized exchanges would be the closest
direct contact that most ordinary people visiting one of the towns
would have with a saint.
Indeed, most ordinary people are kept socially and spatially apart
from the saints. Access to the saints is so consistently regulated that
it cannot be emphasized enough. I encountered many people—fol-
lowers, those with some sort of problem, or simply the curious—
who explained how they had made the journey to one of the provincial
towns at times other than during the annual visits, but they had
been unable to see the saint.22 Such access to the saints is even
restricted for those who live in the towns. At the weekly Friday com-
munal prayers when the saints usually pray with their respective
communities, social and spatial distance is sharply marked. For exam-
ple, one saint usually prays inside a building at his zpwiya (Ar., Sufi
center), unseen by most others who pray together in the more pub-
lic space of the zawiya. Before and after prayer, this saint moves in
and out of the more public space. As hè does so, women seated
together in an area behind the men, as in a mosque, watch the
saint, and some of the women ululate when hè is in their view.
Usually, the saint and his retainers allow men and boys to approach.
Women and girls are not permitted in this central space of the zawiya
during prayer times and thus watch from afar. The saint stands for
a few minutes inside the portal of the building that houses his pri-
vate space for prayer. Garnering on the verandah before the saint,
men and boys, including many of lower status—the unemployed, the
infirm, and the destitute—approach to touch the saint's outstretched
hand, which they someümes also kiss, out of respect and/or in order
to be blessed (cf. Messick 1993, Gilsenan 1982). Others lower their
heads so that the saint might touch them. Throughout, several retain-
22 Although space limitations prevent me from discussing more fully the issue of
access to the saints, I do want to note that the saints' retainers, who are often priv-
üeged members of their entourages, act as intermediaries with almost all of those
seeking access to them. I am also unable to discuss the different ways of gammg
access such as mobilizing kin or cliënt ties with the saints I have discussed some
of these issues in Soares n.d. l.
MUSLIM SAINTS IN THE AGE OF NEOLIBERALISM 91
ers engage in crowd control. They prevent people from lingering too
long or getting too close to thé saint.
While it is clear that thé régulation of access to such saints is
important in no small part because of the sheer nurnber of follow-
ers involved, the limited visibility of such religieus leaders enhances
their sanctity and power (Graeber 1996, cf. Eickelman 1976). A vis-
itor or even someone living in one of the provincial towns might
catch a glimpse of the saint during communal prayers, possibly hear
a message delivered on his behalf over a loudspeaker, or even kiss
his hand after communal prayers. But a private audience with a
saint—no matter how much desired—is nearly unattainable for most
ordinary people, who, thus, are usually unable to communicate their
own this- or other-worldly concerns directly to a saint. We might
say, in neo-Durkheimian fashion, that such people (résidents or vis-
itors to the towns) with often quite different backgrounds forge a
collective religieus identity, expressing this identity as followers of
one of the saints.23 Such people receive blessings and/or potential
merit in exchange for their gifts.
Although for centuries certain Muslim saints in West Africa have
been associated with commodities, such as the gold, sait, and slaves
they accumulated and exchanged during the trans-Saharan trade,
and, more recently, with major cash crops, such as groundnuts in
neighboring Senegal, recent processes of commodification have com-
plicated matters.24 In recent years, visits with saints have increasingly
corne to resemble a marketplace in that contact with them has come
to be mediated on an unprecedented scale by both commodities and
money. In what are clearly new ways of indirect access to saints,
people are able to purchase désirable Islamic religious commodities
(cf. Starrett 1995). Most notably, one saint's image was printed on
bolts of fabric in exactly the same way the Pope's image has been
printed on fabric in Africa. The fabric with the saint's image almost
immediately became a best-seller among those who were fond of the
23 As I have argued elsewhere (1996b), Turner's notion of 'communitas' (1973)
is not quite applicable hère.
24 On the history of this région of West Afnca dunng the trans-Saharan üade,
see Willis 1976. Kor the mvolvcment of saints m the economy of Senegal, see the
important studies of the Moundes by Cruise O'Bnen (1971, 1975) and Copans
(1988). Although the involvement of members of the other Sufi orders in the econ-
omy in Senegal remains to be written, see Ferry 1998.
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saint. Depending on one's means, one can also purchase a saint's
photo that might easily cost more than the average daily wage. Or,
since the late 1980s, one can also usually purchase a videocassette
recording of the proceedings of the annual visit that features close-
ups of the saint, members of his inner circle and sometimes even
the anthropologist. Needless to say, such videos—produced in towns
where public electricity is unavailable—are many more times expen-
sive than a saint's photo. In some cases, saints have authorized cer-
tain individuals to make what amount to official video recordings of
the annual visits and sometimes to take their portraits. Guaranteed
such privileges, some of these people—entrepreneurs so to speak—
have profited handsomely from the sale and distribution of these reli-
gious commodities.25 Given how eager people are to add a saint's
photo to their collections, many recognize the potential profit to be
had frorn the reproduction and sale of saints' photos. At the annual
visits, I have watched as crowds have quickly gathered around those
announcing the sale of official and unofficial photos.
All of these religieus commodities—photos, videos, printed fab-
ric—can be widely diffused.26 Indeed, they circulate with the visitors
who pass them on through trade and exchange with others at home
and among migrant communities elsewhere in Africa and beyond
who might not be able to travel to the provincial towns for the
annual visits. I have found such religieus commodities—photos of
saints prominently displayed in living rooms and videos of the annual
visits—in the homes of Malian migrants living in France. More than
one Malian in France told me hè recognized me from viewing the
official videotaped recordings of those annual visits I attended (and
during which I was invariably videotaped). And because of my asso-
ciation with and relatively easy access to the saints, Malians repeat-
edly ask me to give them or even to seil them photos of the saints
they assume I must have.
Such religieus commodities have certainly helped to spread the
réputations of the saints and their 'famé' (Munn 1986), but also their
presumed are of power. For many, these religious commodities unam-
biguously index the saint's influence and sanctity. These religious
commodities have undoubtedly helped to make the handful of saints
20 See Tambiah 1984 on amulets.
26 The fabric seems to have been rareiy worn, mstead becommg a collector's
item that women store away with the intention of passing on to female kin.
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superstars, not least because most are aware that it is not just any-
one whose image can be commercially viable. Many seem truly awed
by the video and photographie images of the enormous crowds gath-
ered under the leadership of the respective saints during the annual
visits. Some have told me that they have made plans to attend or
have actually attended the annual visits after the lasting impression
such images have made on them. This has not, however, meant the
unproblematic spread of the saints' influence along with the flow of
such religious commodities. It is interesting to note that the fabric
with one of the saint's images and, by extension, that particular saint
became the subject of critique by certain Muslims, perhaps a minor-
ity, who have been opposed to such representational art. Such peo-
ple—we might call them 'reformist' Muslims—see such images as
évidence that the saint, or, at the very least, some of his followers
are guilty of idolatry or 'association' (Ar., shirK), that is, treating things
other than God as a deity; in short, this is un-Islamic behavior.27
This is just one feature of a larger Muslim 'reformist' discourse that
contests the legitimacy of all supposed living Muslim saints, their
alleged powers of intercession, and, by extension, giving gifts to them.
Such criticisms are very serious indeed and may partly explain
why some saints have taken steps to restrict the commercialization
of their images or what they see as excessive profiteering in the sale
of such images. Clearly, the saints do not savor the idea of just any-
one profiting fmancially from the sale of their images. On more than
one occasion, I have seen a saint stop someone from taking his photo
or videotaping him. Once I watched as a saint instructed a mem-
ber of his entourage to prevent a young man from videotaping him
and the activities at the annual visit. I later learned that the young
man was the son of a wealthy migrant without any particular attach-
ment or relationship to the saint, and this man was merely seeking
to exploit the commercial possibilities of videotaping the saint. While
the saints have sometimes reacted angrily to the unauthorized com-
mercialization of their images or excessive profiteering, they have
not been able to control the prolifération and circulation of these
commodities, even if they wished.
27 On so-called reformist Muslims and their discourses in Mali, see Brenner 1993,
Amselle 1985, and Soares 1997a, 1997b. For Niger, see Masquelier 1999.
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why some saints have taken steps to restrict the commercialization
of their images or what they see as excessive profiteering in the sale
of such images. Clearly, the saints do not savor the idea of just any-
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Amselle 1985, and Soares 1997a, 1997b. For Niger, see Masquelier 1999.
94 BENJAMIN F. SOARES
Free-ßoating Sanctifiers and the Service Economy
For members of the West African elite—successful merchants, gov-
ernment officials, civil servants, politicians, even heads of state and
their kin—visits with Malian saints are, as one might imagine, rather
different from visits with ordinary people. The vast resources—eco-
nomie and political capital—of such people facilitate their interac-
tions and ties with the saints. This is particularly the case for those
Malians who seem to have benefited most from some of the changes
associated with neoliberalism, particularly liberalization and the open-
ing up of new markets to foreign imports and the expansion of the
export sector. These include those merchants, investors, and gov-
ernment officials (such as customs agents) involved as major actors
in the trade in imports—foodstuffs, fuel, and consumer items rang-
ing from electronics to automobiles—as well as traders in precious
gemstones. In other words, those entrepreneurs who have been able
to make the most of some of the recent economie changes. In gén-
éral, many—perhaps most—of the elites interested in the saints do
not participate in the annual large-scale visits. If some of them sim-
ply want to avoid the crowds, others prefer that their interactions
with a saint remain discreet, even secret. After all, many such peo-
ple want to visit a saint for help with urgent this-worldly matters—
wealth, commercial success, political power—that they would hope
to keep private. Moreover, they would want to ensure that they have
the undivided attention of the saint and his charisma—something
very difficult, if not impossible, to achieve during the large-scale vis-
its with thousands of participants.
It is not an exaggeration to say that the world of commodities
saturâtes the interactions between saints and the elite. For some
members of this elite, their visits have come to be like holiday tours;
they arrive in private or hired cars or by commercial or chartered
flights from the capital. Sometimes they send their private cars over-
land to meet them at the airport at their destination. In certain cases,
they lodge in luxury accommodations that have been specially con-
structed since the late 1980s for visitors not accustomed to provin-
cial living. Some have even built their own luxury homes for their
regulär visits to the saint's town.
Unlike the ovcrwhelming majority of visitors to the towns, these
visitors are usually guaranteed relatively direct access to the saints.
Their visits invariably include a private audience with the saint dur-
ing which they are able to communicate their concerns directly to
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him. It seems that they gain this much less restricted access because
of the lavish nature of their gifts. Although saints and their entourages
readily deny the truthfulness of such a statement and note that saints
dispense blessings to one and all, those who are the bearers of gifts of
gréât value—new imported cars, expensive wristwatches, and accom-
modation in luxury hotels during the saint's European tours—never
have difficulties in seeing the saint and attaining personal meetings.
In exchange for sumptuous gifts, the saints give blessings to the
elites, as they do for the ordinary followers. But the saints also per-
form much more personalized services for them.28 That is, the saints
usually employ special prayers so that the elites might obtain what
they désire. The saints might also use some of the other Islamic eso-
teric sciences, including forms of mystical retreat (Ar., khalwd) and
Islamic 'divination' (Ar., istikhara) for these high-status visitors (cf.
Shaw 2002). It is possible that the saint or a member of his entourage
will write special, presumably personalized texts in Arabic (the lan-
guage of the sacred texts in Islam) for them to wear or to keep as
amulets, or even write texts to ingest or with which to wash after
effacing with water. These blessings, prayers, and amulets are also
religious commodities, and they also seem to possess some of the
charisma of the saints (cf. Tambiah 1984). But they are différent in
a number of ways that make them potentially more powerful than
thé other commodities like photos and vidéocassettes.29 Thèse reli-
gious commodities are not only presumably more personalized, but
also always concealed, that is, not publicly displayed. Moreover, thé
actual contents of such religious commodities will almost always
remain mysterious to thé récipient, thereby enhancing their power.
Finally, most people assume that such powerful religious commodi-
ties would almost always be given in exchange for gifts of gréât
value. Thus, thé personalized religious commodities are much more
highly valued and coveted than those available and affordable to
most ordinary people. In exchange for their gifts, élite followers hâve
relatively unfettered access to thé saints, their blessings, and more
personalized and, therefore, powerful religious commodities.30
28 It is important to note that saints are not known to visit other people, though
a member of their entourage might do so on their behalf
29 Elite followers are also more likely to hâve personalized photos of the saints
in which they pose with one of thé saints. Thèse are prominently displayed in homes
and in places of business
TO This is not unlike Werbner's (1990) discussion of a hierachical gift economy
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At least some of the elites, who do not necessarily have any long-
range spiritual—even ideological—commitments to the saints, efFectively
pay them fées for services.31 In fact, certain elite followers are known
to solicit more than one saint. That is, after visiting one saint for
help with a particular problem, a person might visit another saint
for the same, still unresolved problem. It is significant that such a
practice is something that is explicitly forbidden in locally under-
stood Islamic religious doctrine, whereby one must not frequent
Muslim religious leaders, including saints, indiscriminately.32 In their
relations with some members of the elite, the saints have thus become
what we might call free-floating sanctifiers in a religious economy
that is more like a market. AJthough this might seem to be the lan-
guage. of an outside analyst, I have indeed heard some Malians
express such views. They criticize the activities of certain Muslim
religious leaders, though generally without naming names, denounc-
ing them as petty traders or merchants who seil their prayers and
amulets, sometimes to the highest bidder. While there is genera!
agreement that saints do not have set fées for their services, many
point to inflation—rising fées for particular services—as well as
inflationary pressures in this service economy. That is, even without
set fees, more is often expected in return for the saintly services.
If some Malians suggested to me that the privileged relations
between elites and saints would eventually undermine the religious
authority of particular saints (cf. Soares 1996b), it is striking that
such criticisms generally do not target the notion of saints or saint-
hood per se. Many people direct their criticisms instead toward those
who act as intermediaries with the saints, frequently accusing them
not only of hindering access to the saints but also of graft and cor-
ruption. This is not unlike the person around a charismatic ruler,
described by Weber, "who can take over responsibility for the acts
of government, especially for failures and unpopulär measures" (Weber
1978, 1147). Needless to say, that saints themselves remain above
criticism is dismaying to certain modernizing actors in Mali, partic-
31 This is a thème I have developed elsewhere (see Soares 1997b). See ComaroiT
1994 (311) and GomarolT and Comaroff 2000 after Wellci 2000 for a broader dis-
cussion of the development of Tee-for-service' religions.
32 This is a subject discussed in some detail in written texts associated with the
Tijaniyya Sufi order where people are mstructed to choose a religious leader and
nol to frequent others. See Abun-Nasr 1965.
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ularly members of the small, urban secular elite.33 For some mem-
bers of this elite, saints embody all that they find reprehensible about
the 'traditional.' For instance, I know many Malian civil servants
who condemn in often very moralizing—though always rather
hushed—tones what they see as the profiigacy of the Muslim saints.34
Be this as it may, one can say that for many people in postcolo-
nial Mali, religious authority has been personalized in these provin-
cial saints. Although this notion of personalization draws upon the
writings of Weber, it départs significantly from them. According to
Weber, when charisma becomes routinized, it is necessarily less 'rev-
olutionary' and less important. In this way of thinking, if charisma
becomes hereditary and attached to a particular lineage, it also
becomes 'depersonalized' (Weber 1978, 1135ff.). However, what I
want to argue is that charisma in this setting has not undergone a
process of 'suffocation' in the face of material interests (ibid., 1120).
Rather, charisma is a potentiality that manifests itself in the per-
sonalized authority of certain religious leaders, who come from cer-
tain lineages with hereditary sanctity. Indeed, such figures have been
able to re-personalize charisma. The commodity form has been a
key element in this process of personalization.
Religious authority has come to be centered on a few individual
saints rather than any institutions like the Sufi organizations with
which they have historically been associated (cf. Weber 1978, 1135ff.).
Indeed, if anything, the institutional basis of the Sufi orders has been
shrinking in postcolonial Mali, a situation, which, by almost all reports,
does not seem to be the case in neighboring Senegal.35 Even in those
régions in Mali where the Sufi orders have been important histori-
cally, it is increasingly rare for people to be initiated formally into
any Sufi order. However, the décline in the organizational impor-
tance of the Sufi orders does not mean that notions of hierarchy
and charisma, embodied most importantly in the notion of the Muslim
saint, are any less important. Nor does this suggest that people have
been embracing more 'reformist' ideas about Islam—though this is
33 On urban-based secularists in Mali, see Brenner 1993 and Soares 1997b.
34 As Miller (1995a) points out, many social scientists that study commodities and
consumption use very similar moralizing discourses. See also Millei 1995b.
35 The continuing importance of the Sufi orders in Senegal undoubtedly relates
to différences in the colonial expérience, particularly French colonial policies towards
Muslims, as well as postcolonial state policies. See the références in note 3.
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happening in some cases—or even that some are finding 'secular-
ism' more appealing. To the contrary, with the décline in the orga-
nizational importance of the Sufi orders, certain Muslim saints have
become known for their individual saintly qualifies and their associ-
ation with wondrous things. It is striking that the saints' rise to promi-
nence has paralleled some of the broader transformations associated
with neoliberalism, including the shift to more contractual relations
as witnessed elsewhere (see Comaroff and Comaroff 2000).
If many Malians from all sectors of society express disdain for cer-
tain kinds of ordinary religions specialists, particularly those minor
'traditional' Muslim religious figures who make a living as diviners
or sellers of amulets, these very same people often consider a par-
ticular Muslim saint authentic. This is the case even though many
admit that one might never know for sure if someone is truly a saint.
In any case, the presumed saints attract followers and clients from
all sectors of society, from the poorest to the most influential, includ-
ing African heads of state and government ministers, not all of whom,
one should note, are Muslims (see Diallo 1988). Similarly, I know
self-professed 'reformist' Muslims involved in one way or another in
the neoliberal economy who have traveled themselves to visit the
saints, seeking blessings from them or their intercession with God to
facilitate business transactions or to ensure fmancial success.
Although visits with saints have been occurring for centuries in
West Africa, such activities have expanded and accelerated, espe-
cially in the recent postcolonial period. The French colonial state
took particular note of gifts, especially hadaya, given to Muslim reli-
gious leaders and often tried to restrict considérable accumulation
on their part, not to mention ordinary people's visits with them.36
In the late 1930s, a Muslim saint—the father of one of the saints
discussed here—received a brand-new imported Ford Mercury as
hadaya from a group of his followers who lived in the more pros-
perous neighboring French colony of Côte d'Ivoire. That this saint
had at his disposai means of transport in considerably better shape
than that of the local colonial officials was certainly dismaying to
certain French administrators.37 The saint's African Muslim follow-
ers (not to mention his African detractors) could hardly have missed
* This also related to the broader French colonial pohcies lowards Muslims (la
politique musulmane) in this part of West Afnca.
" Archives Nationales du Mali, Koulouba, unclassified documents, 1937-1939.
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so obvious a fact.38 Unlike thé colonial state, the postcolonial Malian
state has not restricted thé interactions between saints and their fol-
lowers, nor the exchange, accumulation, and redistribution of resources
around them. In fact, thé postcolonial state has often facilitated such
interactions and accumulation, thercby helping to boost the réputa-
tions of certain saints who sometimes attract followers from across
thé région. It is widely discussed in Mali how thé postcolonial state
and its agents exempted thé saints from paying import duties on
those things considered hadaya. If General Moussa Traoré, Mali's
second président, lavished gifts upon thé saints, it is worth empha-
sizing that extravagant gifts from officials from the highest levels of
thé government to thé very same saints have continued in the era
of multiparty élections in Mali. Modem means of communication
and transportation have been important to thé activities around thé
saints. On a much greater scale, people—elite and nonelite—are able
to travel relatively easily over greater distances to thé towns for thé
annual visits and at other times of thé year and give gifts to thé saints.
Such gift giving has only intensified in thé neoliberal era. I have been
present on several occasions when new imported cars have been deliv-
ered to the saints, who, like their colonial-era predecessor mentioned
above, not only have better and newer vehicles than the local post-
colonial administration, but generally a wider sélection of cars, includ-
ing the latest models. In thé 1990s, Malian saints received Toyota
Landcruisers and pickup trucks—the preferred vehicles for navigat-
ing roads that have seriously deteriorated since the colonial era when
they were built and maintained through thé use of forced labor.
But why the focus on a handful of saints? There is a prevailing
notion that there can be only one spiritual head within a particular
saintly lineage (cf. Bagayoko 1987). Thus, certain individuals—either
thé oldest or most 'charismatic'—become a major, if not the sole,
locus of gift giving for a particular saintly lineage. In récent times
of économie and political uncertainty—structural adjustment, cur-
rency dévaluation, political upheaval—many ordinary Muslims have
turned to the provincial saints who are thought to be close to God.
Many of those looking to the saints are urban-dwellers or migrants
associated with urban économie activities and market trading. Many
such people are struggling to attain wealth and économie success or
38 It is perhaps no coïncidence that thé colonial administration eventually accused
this saint of subversive intent.
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simply to maintain and to reproduce what they have already acquired
in an increasingly precarious economy. In many cases, they appeal
to the provincial saints when their chances of economie success seeni
dim. What seems to be new in this era of fast wealth is that many
facing bankruptcy will often try to secure loans in order to provide
expensive gifts that they otherwise could not afford. It is surprising
(at least to me), though apparently not unusual for a saint's retainer—
whose own economie success might also be precarious—to inform
someone even publicly that an intended gift to a saint is woefully
inadequate. One struggling petty merchant I know pleaded with his
friends and relatives to loan him the money hè needed to purchase
a gift of significant value for one of the saints. Others facing ruin
in risky trading schemes or those attempting to profit from the sale
of cheap Imports travel to the saints' towns in a desperate bid to
reverse their fortunes. I have also met others involved in the traffic
in precious gemstones who do the same. Such ordinary people révère
the same Muslim saints as the elites, drawn by a saint whose répu-
tation they very well may have learned about through word of mouth,
the mass media, and populär culture. Rumors about saints, wealth,
and potential wealth circulate widely, with many of these rumors
focused on the wonders of defying the uncertainties of the market.
I cannot recall how often I have heard ordinary Malians discuss the
fantastic wealth of the country's most prominent merchants and the
newfound and sometimes instant wealth of Malians of modest means
as a direct result of their association with the saints and their pre-
sumed services. With such attention on the saints' wonders and gift
giving focused so closely upon them, people effectively push other
members of the saintly lineages out of the religieus economy, per-
manently or at least until a period of succession in the event that
the saintly character of a particular lineage has not been exhausled.
It is significant that the saints usually remain in their provincial
towns. With very few exceptions, they do not visit others. They travel
rarely to the large towns in Mali, and when they do visit, say, the
capital, they never stay very long.39 While cities and large towns are
known as places where décadence and impiety reign (the exact oppo-
site of what saints are thought to embody [Werbner 1998]), more
M Samts might visit the capital when they are m transit, for example, to catch
a flight to perfoim the /% or to visit followers in Europe or possibly to seek méd-
ical attention in one of the capital's private clinics.
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important, perhaps, is the fact that the religious economy in such
large urban centers is invariably more complex and diverse. In short,
compétition is much more intensive there. All of this is without men-
tioning the saints' potential critics—urban-based secularists and
'reformist' Muslims who contest the legitimacy of saints.
Conclusion
An expanded network of persons—elite and nonelite—is in patronage
relations with the saints and their lineages, transferring commodities
and money to them. In this era of marked economie décline, the
scale of the annual visits has gone up, and there have been huge
infusions of capital, construction of expensive homes, and the acqui-
sition of luxury items by the saints. The great wealth of the saints
has allowed them to maintain enormous households in which the
women—wives and daughters—live in seclusion and in great com-
fort. Although it should be clear by now that saints are not neces-
sarily expected to lead austère lives, the saints do, however, provide
alms—never enough, some critics note—for the many poor individ-
uals who gather around them and reward their faithful followers.
Through accumulation, the individual saints have been able to exhibit
the signs of wealth, very large families, and support of followers, the
'gifts of God' that index their sanctity and seeming immunity from
the incredible political and economie uncertainty most people face—
in short, their 'power.' The saints seem to have been immune to
the 1991 overthrow of a seemingly omnipotent president with whom
they all had ties. Moreover, as many Malians point out, they seem
not to have suffered financially (and may even have profited) when
the currency was devalued by half at the beginning of 1994. Last
but not least, the saints demonstrate the unambiguous capacity for
successful—indeed even hypersuccessful—social reproduction in this
era of neoliberal reforms, décline, and crisis.
The elite followers have been key actors, facilitating the displays
of wealth that have helped to boost the réputations of the saints,
reinforcing and extending their religious power and authority. But
nonelite followers have been no less important here, because of their
number, the volume of their gifts, and the new religious commodi-
ties they help to diffuse. Malian saints in postcolonial Mali have the
réputation of being more pious than ordinary people, as being moral
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exemplars, and, in this way, somewhat like Weberian puritans; how-
ever, they are not ascetic, even if they do live far from major urban
and economie centers. In Mali, commodification has been perhaps
one of the most important factors in the personalization of religieus
authority in certain Muslim saints, ensuring that the saints embody
much that is elusive—sainthood, wealth, famé—though no less désir-
able for many if not most ordinary people in the age of neoliberal-
ism and market triumphalism. As Weber suggested long ago, the
relationship of religious practices and the market is very complex
indeed. In this case too, it would be tendentieus to claim that neolib-
eralism has reduced religion to the logic of the market. After all,
certain Muslim saints in Mali seem to have even more authority,
not least for their seeming capacity to defy the vagaries of the mar-
ket and to infuse that very market with its allure.
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